

The Chechen Wars Will Russia Go The Way Of The Soviet Union

This book aims at assessing the potential impact the European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) has had on the conduct of Russian Federation during the armed conflict in Chechnya. The research proved that the ECtHR indeed managed to develop authority over the strategic behaviour of Russia and despite some limitations was capable of influencing the Russian conduct in the fight against Chechen separatists. On the other hand, the research also showed that Sweet's argument that judicialization is a form of socialization and states not only get progressively used to the judicial mechanism, but increasingly engage on a constructive level, has so far failed to materialise. To the contrary, with growing number of lost cases in Strasbourg, Russia tends to securitize the discourse applied both domestically and internationally vis-à-vis the Court.

Within five years of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic conflicts spilled throughout its territory, most of them in the Russian Federation. An analysis of scope and intensity of a conflict with one of Russia's two hundred ethnic minorities is the focus of this book. The conflict in Chechnya erupted into two full-scale wars, fought during the decade of Russia's turbulent transition from communism toward democracy. Using a variety of sources-governmental documents, monographs, diaries of military and political leaders, reports, and contemporary periodicals-the author examines the roots of the conflict and responses to the wars from the media, political parties, and diplomatic circles in Russia and the United States. The Chechen wars have demonstrated the limits of the concept of self-determination for an abused minority population. The military operation in Chechnya has eroded Russian democracy and strengthened those within the military and security forces who call for a return to the old ways. For many in today's Russian elite, the restoration of the lost Soviet empire might be the ultimate objective. The developments in the future deserve the world's attention. *Terror in Chechnya* is the definitive account of Russian war crimes in Chechnya. Emma Gilligan provides a comprehensive history of the second Chechen conflict of 1999 to 2005, revealing one of the most appalling human rights catastrophes of the modern era--one that has yet to be fully acknowledged by the international community. Drawing upon eyewitness testimony and interviews with refugees and key political and humanitarian figures, Gilligan tells for the first time the full story of the Russian military's systematic use of torture, disappearances, executions, and other punitive tactics against the Chechen population. In *Terror in Chechnya*, Gilligan challenges Russian claims that civilian casualties in Chechnya were an unavoidable consequence of civil war. She argues that racism and nationalism were substantial factors in Russia's second war against the Chechens and the resulting refugee crisis. She does not ignore the war crimes committed by Chechen separatists and pro-Moscow forces. Gilligan traces the radicalization of Chechen fighters and sheds light on the Dubrovka and Beslan hostage crises, demonstrating how they undermined the separatist movement and in turn contributed to racial hatred against Chechens in Moscow. A haunting testament of modern-day crimes against humanity, *Terror in Chechnya* also looks at the international response to the conflict, focusing on Europe's humanitarian and human rights efforts inside Chechnya.

A former KGB spy, Vladimir Putin is one of the world's most enigmatic figures. This is his Russia. Internationally admired for her fearless reporting, award-winning journalist Anna Politkovskaya turns her steely gaze on President Putin and his early regime in this explosive book. From Putin's tyrannical grip on ordinary citizens to rampant corruption in highest ranks of the government, as well as Mafia dealings, scandals in the provinces and the decline of the intelligentsia, Politkovskaya offers a scathing condemnation of the President and his rule,

revealing a shocking state of affairs: soldiers dying from malnutrition, parents requiring to bribes to recover their dead sons' bodies and conscripts are being hired out as slaves. More relevant and important than ever in today's political landscape, Putin's Russia is both a gripping portrayal of a country in crisis and the testament of an extraordinary reporter. 'A searing portrait of a country in disarray and of the man at its helm, from the bravest of journalists' New York Times 'Anna Politkovskaya is a heroic journalist' Guardian 'We will continue to learn from her for years' Salman Rushdie

What challenges does today's Russia pose for the United States and the U.S. Air Force? If certain economic, military, social, and political negative trends in Russia continue, they may create a new set of dangers that might prove more real, and therefore more frightening, than the far-off specter of Russian attack ever was. In a number of scenarios, the U.S. Air Force is certain to be called upon for transportation and perhaps for various military missions in a very demanding environment.

Widespread media interest into the Chechen conflict reflects an ongoing concern about the evolution of federal Russia. Why did the Russian leadership initiate military action against Chechnya in December 1994 but against no other constituent part of the Federation? This study demonstrates that the Russian invasion represented the culmination of a crisis that was perceived to have become an increasing threat not only to the stability of the North Caucasus region, but also to the very foundations of Russian security. It looks closely at the Russian Federation in transition, following the collapse of the communist Soviet Union, and the implications of the 1991 Chechen Declaration of Independence in the context of Russia's democratisation project.

This fully updated book offers the first systematic analysis of Putin's three wars, placing the Second Chechen War, the war with Georgia of 2008, and the war with Ukraine of 2014-2015 in their broader historical context. Readable and clearly argued, this study is essential for understanding the dynamics of Putin's regime."

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin improvised a system of "asymmetric federalism" to help maintain its successor state, the Russian Federation. However, when sparks of independence flared up in Chechnya, Yeltsin and, later, Vladimir Putin chose military action to deal with a "brushfire" that they feared would spread to other regions and eventually destroy the federation. Matthew Evangelista examines the causes of the Chechen Wars of 1994 and 1999 and challenges Moscow's claims that the Russian Federation was too fragile to withstand the potential loss of one rebellious republic. He suggests that the danger for Russia lies less in a Soviet-style disintegration than in a misguided attempt at authoritarian recentralization, something that would jeopardize Russia's fledgling democratic institutions. He also contends that well-documented acts of terrorism by some Chechen fighters should not serve as an excuse for Russia to commit war crimes and atrocities. Evangelista urges emerging democracies like Russia to deal with violent internal conflict and terrorism without undermining the fundamental rights and freedoms of their citizens. He recommends that the United States and other democracies be more attentive to Moscow's violations of human rights and, in their own struggle against terrorism, provide a kind of role model.

The Chechen War was supposed to be over in 1996 after the first Yeltsin campaign, but in the summer of 1999, the new Putin government decided, in their own words, to 'do the job properly'. Before all the bodies of those who had died in the first campaign had been located or identified, many more thousands would be slaughtered in another round of fighting. The first account to be written by a Russian woman, *A Dirty War* is an edgy and intense study of a conflict that shows no sign of being resolved. Exasperated by the Russian government's attempt to manipulate media coverage of the war, journalist Anna Politkovskaya undertook to go to Chechnya, to make regular reports

and keep events in the public eye. In a series of despatches from July 1999 to January 2001 she vividly describes the atrocities and abuses of war, whether it be the corruption endemic in post-Communist Russia, in particular the government and the military, or the spurious arguments and abominable behaviour of the Chechen authorities. In these courageous reports, Politkovskaya excoriates male stupidity and brutality on both sides of the conflict and interviews the civilians whose homes and communities have been laid waste, leaving them nowhere to live, and nothing and no one to believe in. The conflict in Chechnya, going through its low- and high-intensity phases, has been doggedly accompanying Russia's development. In the last decade, the Chechen war was widely covered, both in Russia and in the West. While most books look at the causes of the war, explain its zigzag course, and condemn the brutalities and crimes associated with it, this book is different. Its focus lies beyond the Caucasus battlefield. In *Russia's Restless Frontier*, Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko examine the implications of the war with Chechnya for Russia's post-Soviet evolution. Considering Chechnya's impact on Russia's military, domestic politics, foreign policy, and ethnic relations, the authors contend that the Chechen factor must be addressed before Russia can continue its development.

" The Chechen-Russian conflict was the centuries-long conflict, often armed, between the Russian (formerly Soviet) government and various Chechen forces. Formal hostilities date back to 1785, though elements of the conflict can be traced back considerably further. To understand Chechen history, it is necessary to understand the region's development, including invasion, settlement, emigration, and the various confrontations and conflicts that have transpired there. This book examines the history of one of the most controversial regions in the world. Along with pictures depicting important people, places, and events, you will learn about Chechnya like never before. "

The Russia-Chechen wars have had an extraordinarily destructive impact on the communities and on the trajectories of personal lives in the North Caucasus Republic of Chechnya. This book presents in-depth analysis of the Chechen conflicts and their consequences on Chechen society. It discusses the nature of the violence, examines the dramatic changes which have taken place in society, in the economy and in religion, and surveys current developments, including how the conflict is being remembered and how Chechnya is reconstructed and governed.

This book explains how the internal dynamics of transition have influenced the relationship between Russia and the EU. Taking an holistic approach, the authors present a balanced analysis exploring EU, Russian and US perspectives on the Russian-EU relationship and examine a range of political, economic, business and security issues including the Northern dimension of Russian-EU relations, the Chechen situation, Russian domestic economic policy, trade, the business environment, energy and EU technical assistance. They also address such questions as: * Will bilateral relations be achieved with a Western or Russian model? * Who is the main driver of Russian-EU relations? * Is Russia converging with the EU in terms of business, culture, legal environment and systems? * Does the Russian-EU link provide a new model for EU external relations?

Presented by Russian author and attorney Ilya Milyukov, *Chronicles of the First and Second Chechen War* presents the main events of the First (1994-1996) and Second

(1999-2009) Wars in Chechnya, Russia's deadliest conflicts since World War II. The First War began in December 1994 and lasted for one year and nine months, ending in August 1996. There were two major urban battles - the Battle of the Chechen capital of Grozny from December 1994 to March 1995 and the Battle of Grozny in August 1996 - and two major battles in the rural areas, the Russian offensive in the Southern Chechnya in May and June 1995, and fighting in the foothills part of the Republic from February to May 1996. The Second War began in August 1999 and lasted much longer - until mid-April 2009, for almost ten years. It also included a major urban battle, and it again occurred in New Year's Eve - the Battle of Grozny in December 1999 - February 2000. There was also a major battle in the countryside - the Battle for the village of Komsomolskoye, located in Urus-Martanovsky District, in March 2000. And there were also two large attacks outside Chechnya - in Moscow in October 2002, and in the North Ossetian town of Beslan in September 2004. During these war, Russian federal troops took heavy losses, while the number of civilian deaths reached nearly 400,000 people. Milyukov's expert and meticulous chronicle lists the major events of these conflicts soberly and without editorial comment to document their events in all their brutality and horror.

Putin's style of leadership has transitioned into another era but there is much still inherited from the past. In the often anarchic environment of the 1990s, the nascent Russian Federation experienced misunderstandings and mis-steps in civil-military relations. Under Boris Yeltsin it has been questioned whether the military obeyed orders from civilian authorities or merely gave lip service to those it served to protect while implementing its own policies and courses of action. Robert Brannon sets forth the circumstances under which the military instrument of Russia's power and influence could be called upon to exert force. Deriving in part from its Soviet past, the author examines how Russia's military doctrine represents more than just a road map of how to fight the nation's wars; it also specifies threats to national interests, in this case the United States, NATO and international terrorism. Against this background of politics and power, the military's influence may reveal as much about politics as it does the military.

In this fully illustrated book an expert on the conflicts traces the progress of the wars in Chechnya, from the initial Russian advance through to urban battles such as Grozny, and the prolonged guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions. He assesses how the wars have torn apart the fabric of Chechen society and their impact on Russia itself. Featuring specially drawn full-colour mapping and drawing upon a wide range of sources, this succinct account explains the origins, history and consequences of Russia's wars in Chechnya, shedding new light on the history - and prospects - of the troubled region.

An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planning and carrying out urban operations in Chechnya. Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in the winters of 1994_1995 and 1999_2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches changed over time. The study concludes that while the Russian military was able to significantly improve its

ability to carry out a number of key tasks in the five-year interval between the wars, other important missions--particularly in the urban realm--were ignored, largely in the belief that the urban mission could be avoided. This conscious decision not to prepare for a most stressful battlefield met with devastating results, a lesson the United States would be well served to study. In 2013, the United States suffered its worst terrorist bombing since 9/11 at the annual running of the Boston Marathon. When the culprits turned out to be U.S. residents of Chechen descent, Americans were shocked and confused. Why would members of an obscure Russian minority group consider America their enemy? *Inferno in Chechnya* is the first book to answer this riddle by tracing the roots of the Boston attack to the Caucasus Mountains of southern Russia. Brian Glyn Williams describes the tragic history of the bombers' war-devastated homeland--including tsarist conquest and two bloody wars with post-Soviet Russia that would lead to the rise of Vladimir Putin--showing how the conflict there influenced the rise of Europe's deadliest homegrown terrorist network. He provides a historical account of the Chechens' terror campaign in Russia, documents their growing links to Al Qaeda and radical Islam, and describes the plight of the Chechen diaspora that ultimately sent two Chechens to Boston. *Inferno in Chechnya* delivers a fascinating and deeply tragic story that has much to say about the historical and ethnic roots of modern terrorism.

Told from the perspective of its former Foreign minister, this is a uniquely candid account of Chechnya's struggle for independence and its two wars against Russia which will revise our understanding of the conflict and explain how it continues. Features new insights, intimate portraits of key personalities and a foreword by Zbigniew Brzezinski.

That Russia has vital strategic interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia can be taken as an established political fact. What is remarkable about this fact is that the nature of these interests as well as the nature and intensity of challenges to them have changed quite drastically during Russia's 5 years of existence as a post-Soviet state. It is no wonder that Russian policymakers are permanently agonizing over reassessment of these interests and are now nowhere close to producing a coherent strategy of their advancement. This monograph will argue that Russia's ability to meet the challenges from the South is a major factor in determining its future as a world power.¹ There is no doubt that the Caucasus and Central Asia are two separate regions in the turbulent post-Soviet geopolitical space, with different political dynamics and plenty of internal diversities and conflicts. Even looking from Moscow, it is obvious that these differences are of such a scale that no single integrated strategy could possibly embrace both regions; two essentially different policies are required and were, in fact, pursued. Still, the author attempts to take these two regions together, seeking to trace interplay among Russia's economic, political and strategic interests and to discover parallels in Moscow's past, current and possible future activities. This paper will first take a brief look at the evolution of Russia's policies

in the Caucasus and Central Asia in 1992-94; then the impact of the Chechen War will be evaluated. This is followed by the analysis of the growth of the economic interests (first of all related to oil) and the increase in influence of the regional processes in Russia itself. Finally, an attempt to distinguish between the real and misperceived security challenges for the near future will be undertaken. Two interesting studies on the Russian military provide unique and thought-provoking information: *The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military* and *Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya*. *The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military* - Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian federation has deployed forces for three different large-scale combat operations. These three operations-Chechnya 1994, Chechnya 1999, and Georgia 2008-were conducted facing in each operation, a differently structured opponent. As a result of these different structures, Russian forces were required to conduct both Combat Arms Maneuver and Counter Insurgency. This full spectrum of combat operations provides sufficient material to determine if the military of the Russian Federation has developed a new Russian way of warfare, or if Russian forces are still conducting operations utilizing the same methods as their Soviet predecessors. The determination of a new Russian way of war will be made at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare. As Russia continues to gain wealth from the sale of energy and attempts to expand influence globally, understanding the capabilities and weaknesses of the Russian military will become more important.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * Importance and Scope of the Study * Primary and Secondary Research Questions * Soviet Way of War * Doctrine * Manning * Policy * Background: Turmoil of the Post Soviet Army * CHAPTER 2 - FIRST CHECHEN WAR * Prelude to War: Political Maneuvers and Buildup * Russian Threats Prior to Armed Conflict * Russian Military Preparation * Invasion * Fall of Grozny * Initial Attack * Siege and Fall * Russian Counterinsurgency * Aftermath * CHAPTER 3 - SECOND CHECHEN WAR * Prelude to War: de facto Chechen Independence * Russian Reaction to the Conflict in Dagestan * Political Maneuvers * Russian Military Buildup * Military Developments * Russian Invasion * Russian Siege of Grozny * Fall of Grozny * Russian Counterinsurgency * Techniques * Aftermath * CHAPTER 4 - GEORGIAN WAR * Prelude to War * Russian and Georgian Political Maneuvering * Build-up of Forces and Border Skirmishes * Initiation of Hostilities * Georgian Strategy * Russia's Strategy * Ground Forces * South Ossetia Action * Abkhazia Action * Air Force * Operational Challenges * Aftermath * Political * Economic * CHAPTER 5 - SUMMATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY * How Russian Forces Developed to fit the Operational Environment * Creation of New Doctrine and TTPs to Meet Operational Needs * Russian Organizational Development * Smaller Force * Conscription * Kontraktniki * Utilization of Soviet Doctrine and TTPs to Meet Operational Needs * Lack of Modernity * Russian Response to a Conventional Threat * Conclusion * A Post-Soviet Way of War? Why the Russian Military

Failed in Chechnya - In this era of peacekeeping, an equally valid argument, however, can be made for the early and preventative use of force. Applying firm and decisive military force prior to the onset of hostilities can often serve to deter the potential aggressor. Crudely expressed, spilling a little blood today may preclude spilling a lot tomorrow. When dealing with those who don't share the same liberal beliefs towards conflict resolution, exhaustive diplomatic maneuverings, sanctions and warnings are interpreted as weakness and lack the persuasive power of a resolute, though limited, use of force. In the first Russian military involvement in Chechnya (October 1994-September 1996), we saw a sloppy mixture of these two approaches. Russian tanks crossed into Chechnya in December 1994 to "establish constitutional order in Chechnya and to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia." This drastic step was the last in a series of increasingly forceful and largely unsuccessful attempts to remove Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev from power.

Litvinenko, a Lieutenant Colonel and 20 yr. veteran of the Soviet Military and Intelligence services, created an international scandal at his Moscow press conference that publicity criticized the leaders of the KGB-FSB for numerous illegal orders he'd received. He was imprisoned on false charges, and eventually escaped to Britain where he received asylum. Litvinenko witnessed such outrages as Govt. campaigns to: - Dirty the reputations of Russia's leading businessmen. - Cover-up the corruption in the Govt. Agencies of coercion. - Provoke the Chechen wars to divert Russia away from the path of democracy--back to dictatorship, militarism, nationalism & chauvinsim.- An outrageous Expose of Russia's secret bombing of its own cities in order to blame Chechens. - This story has been featured and confirmed in The N.Y. Times & The Wall Street Journal. - Russia's massive corruption will continue to make front page news, ensuring this book's the relevance.

A state's ability to maintain mandatory conscription and wage war rests on the idea that a "real man" is one who has served in the military. Yet masculinity has no inherent ties to militarism. The link between men and the military, argues Maya Eichler, must be produced and reproduced in order to fill the ranks, engage in combat, and mobilize the population behind war. In the context of Russia's post-communist transition and the Chechen wars, men's militarization has been challenged and reinforced. Eichler uncovers the challenges by exploring widespread draft evasion and desertion, anti-draft and anti-war activism led by soldiers' mothers, and the general lack of popular support for the Chechen wars. However, the book also identifies channels through which militarized gender identities have been reproduced. Eichler's empirical and theoretical study of masculinities in international relations applies for the first time the concept of "militarized masculinity," developed by feminist IR scholars, to the case of Russia.

This book has relevance for those interested in understanding Russia's course in international relations under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. This book will

inform the reader and is especially relevant in light of the events of 2008 in the Caucasus and the war in Georgia, in particular. The author explains the ideology of Neo-Eurasianism, which in turn inspires the policy-thinking of the Kremlin. Also studied is Putin's origins in the KGB, from the previous posts of Secretary of the Security Council and Director of the FSB, and his rise to power in the crucial year of 1999, when he became Russian Prime Minister. The author highlights the continuing trend of appointing high-ranking officers of the Russian intelligence community to senior positions in the government, studying this in the context of Russian civil-military-intelligence relations. The author reached the conclusion, back in 2003, that the members of Russian intelligence hold the reins of power above the civilian and military elements of the Russian government. The author returns to the Kosovo Crisis of 1999, discussing also the motives that led the Kremlin and Putin to invade Chechnya for a second time in a decade. Parallels can be drawn to the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the roots of the Neo-Eurasianist ideology that is behind the two invasions are examined. This book will help the reader understand Russia's current and future distribution of power in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the world at large, Moscow's search for a multipolar world, and its opposition to U.S. hegemony.

Russian history is first and foremost a history of personalized power. As Russia startles the international community with its assertiveness and faces both parliamentary and presidential elections, Lilia Shevtsova searches the histories of the Yeltsin and Putin regimes. She explores within them conventional truths and myths about Russia, paradoxes of Russian political development, and Russia's role in the world. *Russia ?Lost in Transition* discovers a logic of government in Russia ?a political regime and the type of capitalism that were formulated during the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies and will continue to dominate Russia's trajectory in the near term. Looking forward as well as back, Shevtsova speculates about the upcoming elections as well as the self-perpetuating system in place ?the legacies of Yeltsin and Putin ?and how it will dictate the immediate political future. She also explores several scenarios for Russia's future over the next decade.

In the fall of 1994 Russia moved inexorably toward armed intervention in Chechnya, a member of the newly formed Russian North Caucasus Federated States. In reviewing Russian national interests for its subsequent insertion of an armed force into Chechnya, it is evident that President Boris Yeltsin failed to take into account numerous environmental factors.

Consideration of these factors and careful analysis of them should have resulted in the Russians pursuing alternative means in the pursuit of their vital interests. Boris Yeltsin's subordination of Russian national interests to consolidating his sagging political support at home set the stage for an unnecessary military intervention in Chechnya that, combined with a flawed military strategy, was doomed to failure from the onset.

The United States has had a bitter set of experiences with insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations, but it is by no means alone in having to confront such threats and challenges. Indeed, according to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the greatest domestic threat to Russia's security is the ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus. This insurgency grew out of Russia's wars in Chechnya and has gone on for several years, with no end in sight. Yet it is hardly known in the West and barely covered even by experts. In view of this insurgency's strategic importance and the fact that the U.S. military can and must learn for other contemporary wars, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) felt the need to bring this war to our readers' attention and shed more light upon both sides, the Islamist (an nationalist) rebels and

Russia, as they wage either an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign. While the evident and primary cause of this current war is Russian misrule in the North Caucasus in the context of the Chechen wars, it also is true that Russia is now facing a self-proclaimed fundamentalist, Salafi-oriented, Islamist challenge, that openly proclaims its links to al-Qaeda and whose avowed aim is the detachment of the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation. Therefore, we should have a substantial interest in scrutinizing the course of this war both for its real-world strategic implications and for the lessons that we can garner by close analysis of it. The three papers presented here are by well-known experts and were delivered at SSI's third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, European, and American experts to engage in a regular, open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security; this panel realized that ambition, as Dr. Hahn is American, Dr. Markedonov is Russian, and Dr. Cornell is Swedish.

This book argues that the existing scholarship on asymmetric conflict has so far failed to take into account the role of socio-cultural disparities among belligerents. In order to remedy this deficiency, this study conceptualizes socio-cultural asymmetry under the term of asymmetry of values. It proposes that socio-cultural values which are based upon the codes of retaliation, silence, and hospitality – values which are intrinsic to honor cultures, yet absent from modern institutionalized cultures – may significantly affect violent mobilization and pro-insurgent support in that they facilitate recruitment into and support for insurgent groups, while denying such support to incumbent forces. Utilizing Russia's counterinsurgency campaigns in the First and Second Chechnya Wars as an empirical case study, this study explains how asymmetry of values can have an effect on the dynamics of contemporary irregular wars.

The Russo-Chechen conflict has been the bloodiest war in Europe since the Second World War. It continues to drag on, despite the fact that it hits the headlines only when there is some 'terrorist spectacular'. Providing a comprehensive overview of the war and the issues connected with it, the author examines the origins of the conflict historically and traces how both sides were dragged inexorably into war in the early 1990s. The book discusses the two wars (1994-96 and 1999 to date), the intervening truce and shows how a downward spiral of violence has led to a mutually-damaging impasse from which neither side has been able to remove itself. It applies theories of conflict, especially theories of terrorism and counter-terrorism and concludes by proposing some alternative resolutions that might lead to a just and lasting peace in the region.

'Chechnya: from Past to Future' creates a historical framework against which the most pressing issues raised by the Chechen struggle are considered, including the rights and wrongs of Chechen secessionism, the role of Islamic and Western international agencies in defending human rights, the conduct of the war, changing perceptions of the war against the backdrop of international terrorism, democracy in Chechnya itself and the uncertain fate of democracy in Russia as a whole.

There's hardly a person who does not heard of Vladimir Putin. Most of the Western media describe him as an aggressor, dictator and autocrat. We are going to eliminate some of the common myths about Putin and see the real Putin behind the scenes...

So much to read, so little time? This brief overview of *Winter Is Coming* tells you what you need to know—before or after you read Garry Kasparov's book. Crafted and edited with care, Worth Books set the standard for quality and give you the tools you need to be a well-informed reader. This short summary and analysis of *Winter Is Coming* includes: Historical context Chapter-by-chapter overviews Profiles of the main characters Detailed timeline of key events Important quotes Fascinating trivia Glossary of terms Supporting material to enhance your understanding of the original work About *Winter Is Coming*: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must Be Stopped by Garry Kasparov: *Winter Is Coming* tells the

story of Vladimir Putin's stunning rise to power—and is a dire warning. Beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian dissident and chess champion Garry Kasparov traces the circumstances that allowed Putin to flourish, including Russia's aborted attempt at democracy under Boris Yeltsin and the Chechen Wars. Despite Putin's constant and ruthless assaults on civil liberties and international diplomacy—including his botched hostage negotiations in Beslan, corruption and voter fraud, the imprisonment and murders of protesters and opposition figures, and the annexation of the Crimea region in Ukraine—the West and the UN continue to acquiesce to his demands, making him stronger. Learn why Garry Kasparov likens Putin to Adolf Hitler of the 1930s and why he believes that if no one steps in to stop him, the consequences could be disastrous. The summary and analysis in this ebook are intended to complement your reading experience and bring you closer to a great work of nonfiction.

Abstract: At the start of the First Chechen war, the Russian Federation had recently inherited a fractured polity. New leaders tried to piece together a new identity and grand strategy for a state that was still coming to terms with the fact that it was no longer the center of a union. Its new borders were unstable and unsecure, and secession of any one republic threatened a potential chain reaction throughout the region. What Russia needed was a strong, experienced leader, with a clear sense of direction and purpose for the Russian Federation. While many factors contributed to Russia's domestic troubles, Boris Yeltsin proved unequal to the task of effectively consolidating and directing what remained of the Russian Republic. In the case of Chechnya, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian military still retained a vast arsenal and reserves of manpower, which could have overwhelmed Chechnya from the outset - had they been well coordinated and directed. Dzhokhar Dudaev was exactly what Chechnya needed. He had decades of experience in the ranks of the Russian military and thoroughly understood their tactics, and he also had experience in irregular warfare from his service in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. And, of course, he was very familiar with the irregular and unconventional style of warfare that traversed Chechen history. In 1994 and 1995 Dudaev proved his ability to out-strategize the dysfunctional Russian forces, both politically and militarily. In 1996, two factors brought him down: the sheer mass of the Russian forces sent to Chechnya and their tactical adjustments, as well as undermining from competing Chechen factions. His death to a Russian air strike in that same year hamstrung the Chechen government with weak leadership that resulted in disaster for the nascent Chechen state. Neither the 1994 war nor that of 1999 was won or lost solely by the actions of one side or one leader. A mosaic of complex factors, acting on both sides, contributed to the origins, developments, and outcomes of each war. Technological, training, and coordinative flaws in the Russian strategy during the first war were largely rectified in the second. Additionally, the image of potentially legitimate statehood and victimization that the Chechens enjoyed at the start of the first war vanished by the second, causing the republic to lose its badly needed public support in both Russia and abroad in the international community. While noting the complexity of factors involved in the outcome of each war, key individuals at the helm of each polity created successes and failures out of the assets and liabilities at hand. Similarities between the origins of each war, contrasted with the stark differences in how forces executed their operations and the results they achieved, exemplify the significance that leadership has on an army's success or failure. A comprehensive study of the background to the Russian military invasion of Chechnya in 1994.

Completed shortly before Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, the *vysotkii*, or "sky houses," still dominate the Moscow skyline today. Seven in all, they were the Soviet answer to the American skyscraper, transforming the Soviet capital from a feudal backwater into the city of the future. With their soaring towers and gothic architectural details, the *vysotkas* were intended to be enduring monuments to the workers state and to the glories of Communism--though they were built on the backs of slave laborers and, initially, the prerogative only of the Soviet elite. Now these imposing giants lie on the fault line between a world that has vanished and one still emerging from its ruins. When she moved to Moscow several years ago, journalist and Russia expert Anne Nivat settled into one of the *vysotkas*, the one that happens to overlook the Kremlin. She became fascinated by the building and learned everything she could about its history. As she got to know her neighbors and fellow tenants, Nivat discovered that they included some of the building's original inhabitants or their descendants, hand-chosen by Stalin and his henchman Lavrenti Beria (arrested and executed for high treason shortly after Stalin's death)--KGB operatives, Bolshoi ballerinas, and artists of Soviet agitprop. Living side by side with them were representatives of the "new Russia"--entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and oligarchs; as any Moscow real estate agent will tell you, Stalin-era buildings in today's market are some of the most coveted addresses in the city. By means of this decaying but still elegant Soviet icon, Nivat gives us a way of grasping the complexities of a country struggling to come to terms with its past and define its future. She allows the tenants of her *vysootka* to speak for themselves, to offer their perspectives on where Russia has been and where it is going. Some are keenly nostalgic for the days when the State dictated life. Others have prospered in the confusion that has reigned since the Evil Empire's fall and look to a market-driven economy to guide Russia to the Promised Land. Still others fall some place between the two, anxious but hopeful, longing for yet also fearful of change. Taken together, the portraits of the *vysootka*'s inhabitants provide a panorama of Russia today. The View from the *Vysootka* shows us life from the inside, evoking both the forces that have swept through this vast and fascinating nation over the course of the last half-century, as well as a building that has managed to endure them.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of how mobilization and legitimation for war are made possible, with a focus on Russia's conflict with Chechnya. Through which processes do leaders and their publics come to define and accept certain conflicts as difficult to engage in, and others as logical, even necessary? Drawing on a detailed study of changes in Russia's approach to Chechnya, this book argues that 're-phrasing' Chechnya as a terrorist threat in 1999 was essential to making the use of violence acceptable to the Russian public. The book refutes popular explanations that see Russian war-making as determined and grounded in a sole, authoritarian leader. Close study of the statements and texts of Duma representatives, experts and journalists before and during the war demonstrates how the Second Chechen War was made a 'legitimate' undertaking through the efforts of many. A post-structuralist reinterpretation of securitization theory guides and structures the book, with discourse theory and method employed as a means to uncover the social processes that make war acceptable. More generally, the book provides a framework for understanding the broad social processes that underpin legitimized war-making. This book will be of much interest to students of Russian politics, critical terrorism studies, security studies and

international relations.

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